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Overcoming Denial
Contemporary Japan’s Quest for “Normalcy”
[A]s early as
the 1970s in Japan the psychologist Kishida Shu theorized modern
Japan’s condition as schizophrenic. In the 1990s, Kishida’s view was
adopted by the controversial and highly influential intellectual Kato
Norihiro, who similarly ‘diagnosed’ Japan’s postwar ‘illness’ as that
of schizophrenia, arguing powerfully that Japan’s ‘personality’ really
had been splintered into an inner and outer self by the contradictions
inherent in the US occupation of Japan after the war. For him, postwar
Japan had been placed in an impossible position, between the need to
become democratic and the realization that democracy was being imposed
by the former enemy. The result of this dilemma, which he expresses in
his famous book Nihon no mushiso
(Japan’s Thoughtlessness, 1999), is that the ‘public Japan’ accepted
the desires and directives of the USA (notably pacifism and democracy)
as its own, whilst the ‘private Japan’ maintained a divergent and often
contradictorily nationalistic self-image with some elements of
continuity with the imperial period. ...
From this perspective, the meaning and
significance of ‘coming to terms with the past’, or even feeling
penitence for it, shifts: it is no longer about seeking forgiveness
from those who were wronged or about humbling yourself before them and
granting them power over you (that is, the power of forgiveness) —
indeed, it is not about them at all — but rather it is about healing
and transforming yourself. In other words, the popular and influential
schizophrenic thesis regarding the inauthenticity of Japan’s postwar
penitence actually inverts the historical and moral issue, transforming
Japan into the principal victim of World War II and making the
subsequent attempts to come to terms with that war into efforts to heal
and rebuild Japan itself. Critics, both inside and outside Japan, have
been quick to point out that this image is sustained by Japan’s
persistent reluctance to formally acknowledge (or pay reparations to)
the so-called ‘comfort women’, largely Korean and Chinese women who
were exploited as the ‘sex slaves’ of the Imperial Army. (Modern Japan, 130-6) |
The question of Japan’s international ‘normalcy’ has been
pervasive in politics, society, and culture since the early 1990s, and
it remains unresolved to this day. For some commentators, the problem
can usefully be phrased in terms of Japan’s twin deficits:
first, in
terms of the absence of ‘normal’ capabilities
(that is, a powerful
military together with legal mechanisms, and social will, to employ
it) ...
and second, in terms of the absence of ‘normal’ legitimacy in the
international system
(that is, the apparent failure of Japan to ‘come
to terms with its past’ and to apologize to its neighbours).
(Modern Japan, 126)
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Since
the end of the Cold War, the importance of addressing this legitimacy
deficit has increased dramatically. Many of Japan’s attempts to develop
a leadership role in the region have been undermined by the persistent
suspicion that its imperial ambitions remain unreconstructed. ...
[T]here remain critics in East Asia who see all of
Japan’s efforts at regional confidence-building and comprehensive
security as little more than confidence tricks. Wherever they see the
yen, they see the covert insinuation of a new kind of Japanese empire,
sold to the world in the form of financial aid, Nissan cars, Sony
Playstations. Sensitive to such fears, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
has taken the question of image very seriously. In 2007, it launched
the ‘Creative Japan’ campaign, in which it represented Japan as the
home of artistic innovation and pop-culture phenomena, naming anime,
manga, and video games, along with food, fashion, and architecture, as
amongst its primary contributions to world culture. Unlike the USA,
however, which has managed to attract people from all over the world to
its brand of the ‘American dream’, Japan has yet to define a vision of
itself that attracts others to it. (Modern Japan, 137-9)
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