With
the first phase of land reform complete, the economic base of the
bourgeoisie broken, and the Korean War over, the CCP was free in 1953
to develop an integrated plan for the nation’s economic development.
The model adopted was that of the Soviet Union, where state-controlled
industrial production in a sequence of five-year plans was believed to
have been responsible for the nation’s emergence as a world-class power
in the 1930s, with the ability to withstand and repulse the full force
of Germany’s attack in World War II. That victory in turn allowed the
USSR greatly to expand its influence in Europe at war’s end, despite
the United States’ efforts to the contrary. (SMC,
484)
Industrialization
[T]he First Five-Year Plan achieved a dramatic increase in
industrial production across a broad sector of goods (see table below). The plan was
designed to cover the years from 1953 to 1957 ... [but most] of its
targets had already been fulfilled by the end of 1956. ... Gross Output value in millions of 1952 yuan | Indicator (Unit) | 1952
Data | 1957
Plan | 1957
Actual | Actual as
% of Plan | % of total
increase | Industry | 27,000 | 53,560 | 65,020 | 121.4 | 240.8 | Machinery | 1,404 | 3,470 | 6,177 | 178 | 440 | Chemicals | 864 | 2,271 | 4,291 | 188.9 | 496.6 | Physical Output in million metric tons [mmt] and thousand metric tons [tmt] | Indicator (Unit) | 1952
Data | 1957
Plan | 1957
Actual | Actual as
% of Plan | % of total
increase | Coal (mmt) | 68.5 | 113 | 130 | 115 | 190 | Steel Ingot (mmt) | 1.35 | 4.12 | 5.35 | 129.8 | 396.3 | Machine Tools (units) | 13,734 | 12,720 | 28,000 | 220.1 | 203.9 | Trucks (units) | 0 | 4,000 | 7,500 | 187.5 | ∞ | Bicycles (thousand units) | 80 | 555 | 1,174 | 211.5 | 1467.5 |
(cf. SMC, 486) |

The government
had prepared the economy for the five-year plan by curbing inflation,
which was achieved by 1952 despite the pressures for military
production brought on by the Korean War. ...
The state produced a
balanced budget by ruthlessly controlling government spending and
reorganizing the tax system to raise rates on urban dwellers.
Particularly striking here was the reduction in the percentage of the
budget that was allocated to the government’s own administration, and
the effective reduction of military expenses. ...
The government met its budgetary deficits not by
issuing new notes — as the Guomindang had — or by borrowing large sums
from powerful creditors, but by sale of government bonds and the
encouragement of “contributions,” stimulated by mass patriotic
campaigns. (SMC, 485-8) |
Socializing Agriculture
Once
the first land-reform drives had broken the landlords, the state began
methodically to group the peasantry into forms of cooperative labor.
The first stage was to encourage peasants to join mutual-aid teams,
which built on the social consciousness developed in land reform by
showing the heightened productivity that could be obtained by pooling
certain quantities of labor power, tools, and draft animals. (SMC, 490)
|
Posters (left and right) showing the "good points of cooperatives"
Peasants of a mutual-aid team in Shahe County, Hebei Province
|
|
In 1952 and 1953, the government tentatively experimented
with bonding peasant workers from mutual-aid teams into cooperative
units of thirty to fifty households. Land as well as labor was pooled in these
cooperatives, even though each peasant family kept its
title to the plots it contributed. ... At the end of each year, after
the government procurement quotas had been met and some money set aside
for investment in the cooperative, the balance was divided between a
“land share” based on the acreage contributed to the
cooperative by
each family and a “labor share” based on the daily amount
of work each
family performed. This was only a semisocialist arrangement, since
richer peasants, by contributing more land, also gained a greater
reward, for which reason these were termed “lower-stage cooperatives.” (SMC, 491)
By late 1955, however, after extensive propaganda campaigns and
careful experimentation in target areas, the state began to whittle
away at the land share, and increase the percentage that went into the
labor share. ... These higher-stage cooperatives were organized on a much
larger scale, often including 200 to 300 households. They thus exceeded
the size of most traditional rural villages, and demanded more
full-time administrators and party representatives. By 1956 this shift
was well under way, and the lower-stage cooperatives began to shrink in
number as the higher-stage cooperatives gained (see table below). At
the same time, the government dropped its emphasis on mutual-aid teams,
which then ceased to be a significant factor in rural life.
Year
|
Mutual Aid Teams 6-7 households
|
Lower Stage Co-ops
30-50 households
|
Higher Stage Co-ops
up
to 300 households
|
1950
|
10.7%
|
negligible%
|
negligible%
|
1951
|
19.2
|
negligible
|
negligible
|
1952
|
39.9
|
0.1
|
negligible
|
1953
|
39.3
|
0.2
|
negligible
|
1954
|
58.3
|
1.9
|
negligible
|
1955
End of Fall Year
End
|
50.7
32.7
|
14.2
63.3
|
0.03
4.0
|
1956
End of Jan.
End of
July
Year End
|
19.7
7.6 3.7
|
49.6
29.0
8.5
|
30.7
63.4
87.8
|
1957
|
none
|
negligible
|
93.5
|
(cf. SMC, 492) |
Peasants, however, still technically held title to the land they
contributed to the cooperatives, and they were also allowed to keep private
plots for their own use, which further preserved a sense of individual ownership
and gave them scope for their own entrepreneurial skills. ... The resulting surge in
private production began to alarm Mao Zedong and others in the government who
feared the resolidification of the traditional two- or three-class system in the
countryside, in which a new generation of enriched peasantry might begin to rise
at the expense of their less able, or fortunate, or ruthless fellows. ... There was
a paradox in the making, and how the government responded to the increasing
success of private production would be of crucial importance to the next stage
in the history of the People’s Republic. (SMC, 491-3)
Why was Mao so concerned about private land ownership
and the sale of produce on the open market?
Were there potential dangers of eliminating all land ownership
and all opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial activity?
During the first years of the People’s Republic, the
intellectuals of China struggled to find a satisfactory position under
the new regime. ... Education remained a time-consuming and costly
process, and most intellectuals continued to come from families that
had made or inherited money from landholdings or business. Those with
staff positions in the government bureaucracy, or who worked in the
teaching or legal professions, had inevitably had extensive contacts
with, or been employed by, the Guomindang. Those in universities and
the medical and scientific professions had often obtained their
advanced degrees overseas or been taught by Westerners in China.
Since such backgrounds were now considered
“feudal,” “reactionary,”
“comprador,” or “capitalist,” it was incumbent
on the
intellectuals to show their loyalty to the CCP. Most were ready to make
the effort to help the new regime because they had become sick of the
inefficiencies of the old China and had lost any faith that the
Guomindang could bring enduring, constructive change. The CCP’s
promise
that even Guomindang officials might stay on at their jobs had been
reassuring. (SMC,
505-6)
During the early
stages of the First Five-Year Plan, Mao Zedong began to see that
intellectuals — writers as well as scientists and
engineers — of all political persuasions would be needed if there
were to be a surge in China’s productive capacities. ... Cadres were told that they were wrong to “take the
ability to grasp Marxist-Leninism as the sole criterion on which to
base their judgments.” Intellectuals who “are capable of
working honestly and of knowing their work” must be encouraged.
Yet when writers went too far in following
up the logic of these remarks they met with ferocious opposition. ... A
curious situation now developed in which China’s leadership
became bitterly divided over how to deal with its own demoralized
intellectuals. Of the wide spectrum of positions on the matter, two
polar views stood out. One favored continuing the united-front alliance
of the CCP with the intellectuals, arguing that their skills were
desperately needed in the drive to achieve the First Five-Year Plan and
in the transition to collectivized agriculture, and that their loyalty
could ultimately be trusted even if they did criticize the party. The
other held that the unity of the CCP was paramount, that the CCP had
led the revolution and could not now be criticized from outside without
fatal effects on party effectiveness and morale.
The tortuous course of what came to be called the
Hundred Flowers movement emerged slowly from these political
divisions. ... In a speech he delivered on May 2 to a closed session of
party leaders, Mao elaborated on the idea of “letting a hundred
flowers bloom” in the field of culture, and “a hundred
schools of thought contend” in the field of science. (SMC,
507-9)
Mao
had to use all his influence to get a full Hundred Flowers campaign
going. In a free-wheeling and often utopian-sounding speech of February
1957, delivered to a large group of intellectual and Communist leaders,
Mao tried to instill the idea of flexibility and openness into the
minds of his captive audience, in sharp contrast to what had become the
party’s more authoritarian mode — one which he himself had helped to
create. ... Only in late April of 1957, after months of pressure
against foot-dragging party secretaries around the country, did the
full weight of the press and other propaganda organs swing in favor of
the campaign. It was now couched in the rhetoric of a full
rectification movement, in which intellectuals were encouraged to speak
out against abuses within the party. ... The language of the campaign
directive, however, tried to reassure cadres that they would be gently
treated. This was to be a campaign for unity that would bind all in
common progress. It would be, said Mao,
a movement of ideological education carried out seriously,
yet as gently as a breeze or a mild rain. It should be a campaign of criticism
and self-criticism carried to the proper extent. Meetings should be limited to
small-sized discussion meetings or group meetings. Comradely heart-to-heart
talks in the form of conversations, namely exchange of views between
individuals, should be used more and large meetings of criticism or ‘struggle’
should not be held. (SMC,
510) |
|
If we want our country to be prosperous and strong, we must,
besides consolidating the people’s state power, developing our economy and
education and strengthening our national defense, have a flourishing art,
literature and science. That is essential.
If we
want art, literature and science to flourish, we must apply a policy of letting
flowers of many kinds blossom, letting diverse schools of thought
contend.
Literature and art can never really flourish if only one flower
blooms alone, no matter how beautiful that flower may be. Take the
theatre, an example which readily comes to mind these days. Some years
back there were still people who set their face against Peking
opera. Then the Party decided to apply the policy summed up in the
words “let flowers of many kinds blossom side by side, weed through the
old to let the new emerge” to the theatre. Everybody can see now how
right it was to do so, and the notable results it led to. Thanks to
free competition and the fact that the various kinds of drama now all
learn from one another, our theatre has made rapid progress.
 In the field of science, we have
historical experience to draw on. During the period of the Spring and Autumn
Annals (722-481 B.C.) and of the Warring States (403-221 B.C.) more than two
thousand years ago, many schools of thought vied with each other for supremacy.
That was a golden age in the intellectual development of China. History shows
that unless independent thinking and free discussion are encouraged, academic
life stagnates. And conversely, when they are encouraged, academic growth
speeds up. (DC, 399)
Professors Speak Out
Chang Po-sheng & Huang
Chen-lu
June 10,
1957
Chang Po-sheng and Huang Chen-lu at a “contention”
meeting of the faculty members of the Shenyang Normal College on June 10,
jointly made a long speech lasting about three hours. ... The central problem brought
up in the joint speech by these two men was “doing away with the absolute
leadership of the Party.”
“Doing away with the absolute leadership of the
Party,” said Huang Chen-lu, “is aimed at strengthening the Party leadership and
making the Party a vanguard. ... Before the liberation the Party enjoyed high
prestige, maintaining intimate connections with the people and uniting with the
people, and there were no such contradictions as exist today. Since the founding
of the Republic, particularly in the last one or two years, the Party has become
superior to the people and has assumed privileges, praising itself for its
‘greatness, glory and correctness’ and placing itself above the state, above the
people. For this reason, Party prestige is falling day by day. More and more
persons with impure motives join the Party. They join the Party because they can
win glory and acquire power, influence and money. ... The Communist Party has
12,000,000 members, less than 2 per cent of the total population. The 600
million people are to become the obedient subjects of these 2 per cent of
people. What sort of principle is this! The absolute leadership of the Party
must be done away with. The privilege of Party members must be done away
with!”…
“If this state of affairs is to be changed, a system of general
election campaigns should be put into effect alongside the abolition of the
absolute leadership of the Party. ... The Communist Party, if it really represents
the people, will not be kicked out; if the Communist Party is kicked out, it
means it no longer represents the people. Is it pitiable to have such a Party
kicked out?” (DC, 404-6)
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|
The
party secretaries in at least nine of China’s provinces had never
backed the Rectification Campaign, and many others were doubtless only
reluctant participants. Their backlash began in June. They were
supported by those in Peking who had always opposed the campaign but
had been temporarily overruled by Mao. Realizing that the tide was now
going against him, Mao swung to the side of the hard-liners. He altered
the text of “Contradictions” so that it read as if the promised
intellectual freedoms were to be used only if they contributed to the
strengthening of socialism, and this revised version was published and
widely disseminated. It now appeared that the speech was a censure of
intellectuals, rather than the encouragement of public criticisms that
Mao had originally intended it to be. In July, an intensive propaganda
assault against critics of the party was mounted in all major
newspapers across the country, and the CCP announced the start of the “antirightist campaign.” ... By the end
of the year [1957], over 300,000 intellectuals had been branded
‘rightists,’
a label that effectively ruined their careers in China. Many were sent to labor
camps or to jail, others to the countryside not just to experience life on the
land for a year, but into what was essentially a punitive exile that might last
for life.” ... The
blooming of the Hundred Flowers had ended with a vengeance, leaving
China poised for a new era of sharp revolutionary struggle. (SMC, 512-3) |
 |
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