President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Zedong
of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious
and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. Relations and world affairs.
During the visit, extensive, earnest, and frank discussions were
held between President Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai on the normalization of
relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. ... There are essential differences between China and
the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However,
the two sides agreed that countries regardless of their social systems should
conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes
should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use of threat of
force. The United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared
to apply these principles to their mutual relations. ...
The two sides reviewed the long-standing
serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed
its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the
normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government
of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China;
Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland;
the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country
has the right to interfere; and all U.S. Forces and military installations
must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any
activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China,
two governments,” “two Chinas,” an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that
the “status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”
The U.S. side declared: The United States
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain
there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States
Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in
a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With
this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal
of all U.S. Forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime,
it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan
as the tension in the area diminishes.
The two sides agreed that it is desirable
to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they
discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology,
culture, sports, and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and
exchanges would be mutually beneficial. ... Both sides view bilateral
trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and
agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are
in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. (DC, 461-4)
What was in it for each side?
Who was the big loser?
Did Mao betray the revolution?
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The Old Guard Dies
& the “Gang of Four” is Tried
Death was now in the air for China’s aging
revolutionary leaders. Zhou Enlai succumbed first, dying on the morning
of January 8, 1976, at the age of seventy-eight. ... [O]n July 28, 1976,
one of the worst earthquakes in China’s recorded history
occurred, with its epicenter in Tangshan, Hebei. ...
[I]n traditional
Chinese historiography the imminence of profound political upheavals
leading to dynastic collapse was usually heralded by a cataclysmic
natural event such as an earthquake or flood, or by some celestial
portent. Such gross superstitions, of course, were now consigned to the
dustbin of history, but when Mao Zedong died of complications following
his long illness, on September 9, at ten minutes after midnight, many
Chinese must have linked the two events in their minds. (SMC, 580-4)
Though it was Hua Guofeng
who made the final eulogy and thus received the greatest public
attention, the four radical leaders of the Cultural Revolution were
also plainly visible. Wang Hongwen presided over the final ceremonies,
and Zhang Chunqiao was a director of the funeral committee. Jiang Qing,
accompanied by her own and Mao’s surviving children, was prominent at
the funeral, and cameras also focused on Yao Wenyuan. Yet in the final
startling event of an already
dramatic year, all four radical leaders of the Cultural Revolution were
suddenly arrested without warning by Hua Guofeng’s
orders on October 6, and placed in detention at an unknown location.
They were accused of having constituted a clique or “Gang of
Four,” and of having persevered in their evil conduct despite
stern warnings from Mao himself. ...
As more and more charges were
brought against them in October and November, the phrase “Gang of Four” became known to everyone in China. Cumulatively they were accused of
almost every possible crime in the political book, including factional
attacks on Zhou Enlai, forging Mao’s statements, diluting the
criticism of Lin Biao to save their own skin, organizing their own
armed forces, tampering with education (and concocting the story of
Zhang Tiesheng’s blank examination paper), inciting the masses to
fight each other, supporting inefficient techniques by such spurious
claims as “a socialist train behind schedule is better than a
revisionist train on schedule,” attacking worthy government
cadres, criticizing Dazhai and Daqing, disrupting industrial
production, hindering the earthquake relief work, defaming Hua Guofeng,
slandering army veterans, producing subversive films, criticizing
worthy schoolteachers, sabotaging foreign trade, leading the young to
oppose Marxism, and using the public-security apparatus for their own
purposes. The members of the group that had proved so ingenious in
thinking up a miasma of charges against prominent CCP leaders and
intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution now found themselves on
the receiving end of the same process. (The Search for Modern China, 585-6)
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