In an essay he wrote in mid-1949 entitled “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Mao Zedong succinctly spelled out the ideas that would permeate the governmental policies of the new Chinese state. The experience of the revolution to date could be analyzed into two basic categories, wrote Mao. The first was the arousing of the nation’s masses to build a “domestic united front under the leadership of the working class.” ... The second category embraced the international aspects of the revolution, including China’s alliance with the Soviet Union, the countries in the Soviet bloc, and the world proletariat. ... The new government would establish relations with any country willing to respect China’s international equality and territorial integrity. China did not believe it could prosper without any international help. And China, in enforcing the people’s democratic dictatorship, would “deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people alone have the right.” [SMC, 460]

 
 

 
 

A Promising Start? In line with Mao’s statement, Article 5 of the Common Program guaranteed to all, except for “political reactionaries,” the rights of freedom of “thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile, moving from one place to another, religious belief, and the freedom to hold processions and demonstrations.” It promised equal rights to women, and the end of their lives of “bondage.” The program then outlined an ambitious plan for rural reform through rent reduction and land redistribution, and for the development of heavy industry. ...     Exact figures on land reform for the whole of China are hard to come by, but it is estimated that in central south China ... about 40 percent of the cultivated land was seized from landlords and redistributed, and that 60 percent of the population benefited in some way. The gain per head was between 1/6 and 1/2 acre, so that a family of five might receive from below 1 to just above 2 acres. Such amounts could not give families complete security, but for many it opened new possibilities of survival, especially for those who had previously lived in atrocious poverty. [SMC, 461-2]     In the cities, by contrast, the first tasks for the Communist government were to prevent violent social confrontations, and to encourage industries to reopen and workers to stay at their jobs. ... It was CCP policy to keep most city officials in their jobs — often as many as 95 percent — and to guarantee them, along with teachers and even the police, continued employment as long as they joined in group reform and discussion sessions, and studied the works of Mao Zedong. ...     Intensive campaigns were launched against financial speculators, and on behalf of the new government renminbi, or “people’s currency.” ... [C]ampaigns were [also] launched against prostitution and opium addiction. Prostitution was effectively cut back through a system that registered all housing and monitored male visitors and their departure times. Known prostitutes, along with their madams or pimps, were enrolled in speial prisonlike “schools,” where they were lectured on the class contradictions that had led them to waste their lives, and were taught alternative ways of earning their livings. ... Similarly, opium addiction was dramatically reduced with enforced methods of “cold turkey” withdrawal, and by making the former addicts’ families responsible for their staying clean. Mass campaigns against addiction, the uprooting of poppy fields, and the execution of opium traffickers clinched the success of these measures. [SMC, 463-4]   Were these reasonable policies?

 

Diplomatic Recognition of the PRC cf. SMC, 470 1949 October 2 October 3 October 4 October 5 December 9 December 30 USSR Bulgaria, Romania Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia Burma India 1950 January 4 January 6 January 9 January 13 January 14 Pakistan (Great Britain),* Ceylon, Norway Denmark, Israel Finland, Afghanistan Sweden   * The Chinese rejected Britain’s January 6 offer, since the British maintained formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

 

Tibet Autonomous Region within the People’s Republic of China  Historic Tibet as claimed by Tibetan exile groups  Tibetan areas as designated by the People’s Republic of China  Chinese-controlled areas claimed by India as part of Aksai Chin  Indian-controlled areas claimed by China as part of Tibet  Other areas historically within Tibetan cultural sphere   The “Liberation” of Tibet The Tibetan operations, though logistically complex, were not expected to offer much challenge to the now seasoned PLA troops, especially since India had become independent in 1947 and the British had lost their paramount interest in maintaining Tibet’s buffer status. Chinese Communist troops invaded Tibet in October 1950 in order to “liberate” the country from “imperialist oppression.” Despite the poignant Tibetan protest, “Liberation from whom and what? Ours was a happy country with a solvent government,” the United Nations took no action, nor would India or Britain intervene on Tibet’s behalf. The Chinese occupied the key points in the country within a year and pressured the Dalai Lama’s advisers into general acceptance of China’s sovereignty over the region. [SMC, 471]   Tibet in the 20th Century http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet   In 1904, the British sent an Indian military force under Lieutenant Colonel Francis Younghusband, which, after some fighting, occupied Lhasa. In response, the Chinese foreign ministry asserted that China was sovereign over Tibet, the first clear statement of such a claim. In 1907, Britain and Russia agreed that in “conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet” both nations “engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government.” In 1913-14, conference was held in Simla between Britain, Tibet, and the Republic of China. The British suggested dividing Tibetan-inhabited areas into an Outer and an Inner Tibet (on the model of an earlier agreement between China and Russia over Mongolia). Outer Tibet, approximately the same area as the modern Tibet Autonomous Region, would be autonomous under Chinese suzerainty. In this area, China would refrain from “interference in the administration.” In Inner Tibet, consisting of eastern Kham and Amdo, Lhasa would retain control of religious matters only. In 1908-18, there was a Chinese garrison in Kham and the local princes were subordinate to its commander. The Chinese Communist government led by Mao Zedong which came to power in October lost little time in asserting its presence in Tibet. In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army entered the Tibetan area of Chamdo, defeating sporadic resistance from the Tibetan army. In 1951, representatives of Tibetan authority, acting without authorisation from the Dalai Lama, participated in negotiations in Beijing with the Chinese government. It resulted in a Seventeen Point Agreement which affirms China’s sovereignty over Tibet. The agreement was ratified in Lhasa a few months later. Why did China “liberate” Tibet? Does China have a legitimate claim to Tibet?       The Loss of Taiwan The Taiwan challenge was considered far more serious. ... By the summer of 1950 the military consolidation over south China was complete, and a large force of veteran PLA troops were moved to the Fujian coastal region, but they were not ordered into action against Taiwan at that time. ... There was at this time nothing to suggest that the United States would intervene in the Chinese conflict any further. ... State Department staff went ahead and drafted the official statement they would issue once Taiwan had fallen into Communist hands. Public declarations by both General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of occupied Japan, and Dean Acheson now defined the new American “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific as running along a line connecting the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. The Chinese could take note that this definition of American strategic interests did not include Taiwan, nor did it include South Korea, which since 1945 had emerged as an independent state under American patronage, separated from Soviet-dominated North Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel. Once Taiwan was conquered, the PRC could therefore expect to take its rightful place in the United Nations, for which it was already actively lobbying. [SMC, 471-3]       The Korean War The apparent harmony of these American and Chinese stances was shattered on June 25, 1950, when a massive force of North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and invaded South Korea. Within a few weeks, North Korean forces had advanced swiftly down the peninsula, capturing Seoul and forcing the South Koreans to a final desperate stand at the harbor of Pusan. ... President Truman responded by ordering U.S. troops based in Japan to assist South Korea. ... The crucial change in the war came in mid-September, when, in a daring and brilliantly executed amphibious maneuver, MacArthur landed his forces at the harbor of Inchon, to the rear of the North Korean lines, and threatened to cut off their retreat. As the North Korean troops began to break to retreat homeward, Zhou Enlai notified the Indian ambassador, who was acting as the conduit for Chinese messages, that China would have to intervene if the United States invaded North Korea. U.S. troops did cross the border on October 7, and pushed on northward to the Chinese border along the Yalu River. At this point both Stalin and Mao began to waiver ... [arguing] the merits of leaving the North Koreans to their own devices, to fight whatever guerrilla war they were capable of. Only on October 13 — allegedly won over by the passionate arguments of Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang — did Mao agree to allow Chinese “volunteers” to move across the North Korean border as long as the Soviet Union gave full air support. ... The commander of the Chinese forces, Peng Dehuai, coordinated his forces superbly, and in bitter fighting that December, the Chinese pushed the allies back once again to a line along the thirty-eighth parallel. ... The war dragged on for a painful two years, ending with a truce signed in July 1953. ... By that time U.S. casualties had reached over 160,000 (54,000 dead, 103,000 wounded, 5,000 missing), South Korean casualties 400,000, North Korean 600,000, and Chinese between 700,000 and 900,000. ...     [T]he events of the war were used to reinforce Chinese perceptions of the evils of Western imperialism, and particularly to isolate the United States as China’s prime enemy. American involvement in Korea was pointed to as clear evidence of U.S. ambitions in east Asia, and of the implacable hatred of the United States for China and the Chinese people. [SMC, 473-6]

   

Mass Party Mass Campaigns The CCP had learned, during the Yan’an Rectification Campaign of 1942, how to scrutinize itself, force its members into self-criticism, and use group pressure and intimidation to arrive at an apparent consensus. In the early 1950s these experiences surfaced again in four major campaigns involving the mass mobilization of the Chinese people. The first of these was the Resist America and Aid Korea Campaign ... which focused on foreigners in China. The party ordered police searches of alleged spies, confiscated objects such as radio receivers and firearms, and investigated public associations that included or had contact with foreigners — whether these associations were involved in cultural, business, health, or religious pursuits. These investigations scared away many Chinese who had formerly associated with foreigners. Foreign business assets were frozen in December 1950, and foreign businesses — although not wholly expropriated — were pressured into selling out, often at artificially low prices. ...     Given momentum by the anger and excitement of the Korean War, a second mass campaign was directed at domestic “counterrevolutionaries.” Millions of Chinese who had been in Guomindang party or youth organizations, or had served in Guomindang armies, had stayed on in their homeland when the Communists took over. They had never been thoroughly investigated, and some of them no doubt harbored pro-Chiang Kai-shek sympathies. ... As the campaign grew in intensity it became brutal and terrifying. For millions of Chinese the violence and humiliation of these days effectively ended any hope that they would be able to live out their lives peacefully under the Communist regime, whatever their past histories might have been. ...     The CCP leadership had already been planning a third mass campaign — this one against corruption within their own party. Even before the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries campaign was over, the party was mobilizing for what was termed the Three Anti campaign, which was directed against three sets of vices stated to be common among three occupational groups: the three vices were corruption, waste, and obstructionist bureaucracy; the three targeted groups were Communist party members themselves, the wider circles of bureaucratic officials ... and the managers of factories and other businesses. ... The Three Anti drive drew much of its energy from a fourth mass campaign that was waged concurrently — the Five Anti campaign. This campaign was designed as an all-out assault on the bourgeoisie in China, an act of class war that mirrored in scope, rage, and effectiveness its counterpart in the countryside — the campaign against rural landlords. The targets of the Five Anti drive were specifically identified as those Chinese industrialists and businessmen who had stayed on in China after the Communist takeover, and also those who “represented” the capitalist class, a vague definition that could incorporate anyone the state chose to charge. The five vices that were to be expunged were “bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information.” ...   Hu Sidu Denounces his Father, Hu Shi In the old society, I considered my father as an “aloof” and “clean” good man. Even after the liberation I felt deeply insulted whenever my father was being criticized. Within my heart I strongly objected to Premier Zhou Enlai’s calling my father a man who never understood what imperialism means. After I read the History of Social Development, State and Revolution, History of Chinese Revolution and many other books written by Communists, my concept of my father began to change. ...        Today, after my education in the Party, I begin to recognize his true qualities. I have come to know that he is a loyal element of the reactionary class and an enemy of the people. ... Today I realize the lenient policy of the People’s government. It gives a chance to all those who have acted against the interests of the people to live down their past and start life anew, only if they can come to realize their past misdeeds.        Until my father returns to the people’s arms, he will always remain a public enemy of the people, and an enemy of myself. Today, in my determination to rebel against my own class, I feel it important to draw a line of demarcation between my father and myself. ... [DC, 387-9] “[D]espite demonstrating his loyalty to the Communist Party by rejecting his family, Hu Sidu was branded a ‘rightest’ and persecuted. He committed suicide in 1957.” [DC, 387]   In China as a whole, the Three Anti and Five Anti campaigns had an immense effect. The CCP revealed that it was not going to protect private businesses any longer, or tolerate the maze of semilegal practices that had continued in China after 1949. Chinese capitalists were now threatened just as foreign capitalists had been the year before, and enormous fines were levied on them for what were often baseless charges. ... The main purpose of the campaigns was to assert government control over workers’ organizations, and to end the independent modes of operation of capitalists and bureaucratic functionaries. In sharp contrast to the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries campaign, few of the Three Anti and Five Anti victims were killed. Almost all were terrified or humiliated or both, and many had not only to pay their fines but also to repay all money they had allegedly taken in graft or withheld from their taxes; some had their property confiscated and were sent to labor camps. ... At the end of 1952, the CCP leadership felt confident in swelling the ranks of the party as a whole to 6 million. Even those who had never seen a guerrilla unit or experienced life in the countryside now had had at least a taste of revolution. [SMC, 478-83]