In
an essay he wrote in mid-1949 entitled “On the People’s Democratic
Dictatorship,” Mao Zedong succinctly spelled out the ideas that would
permeate the governmental policies of the new Chinese state. The
experience of the revolution to date could be analyzed into two basic
categories, wrote Mao. The first was the arousing of the nation’s
masses to build a “domestic united front under the leadership of the
working class.” ... The second category embraced the international
aspects of the revolution, including China’s alliance with the Soviet
Union, the countries in the Soviet bloc, and the world
proletariat. ... The new government would establish relations with any
country willing to respect China’s international equality and
territorial integrity. China did not believe it could prosper without
any international help. And China, in enforcing the people’s democratic
dictatorship, would “deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak
and let the people alone have the right.” (SMC, 460) |
... “You are dictatorial.” My dear sirs, you are
right, that is just what we are. All the experience the Chinese people
have accumulated through several decades teach us to enforce the people’s
democratic dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to
speak and let the people alone have that right. Who are the people? At
the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban
petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the
working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect
their own government; they enforce their dictatorship over the running dogs of
imperialism — the landlord class and bureaucrat-bourgeoisie [a.k.a. comprador bourgeoisie], as well as the
representatives of those classes, the Guomindang reactionaries and their
accomplices — suppress them, allow them only to behave themselves and not to be
unruly in word or deed. If they speak or act in an unruly way, they will be
promptly stopped and punished. Democracy is practiced within the ranks of the
people, who enjoy the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, association and so
on. The right to vote belongs only to the people, not to the reactionaries. The
combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over
the reactionaries, is the people’s democratic dictatorship. ...
“Don’t you
want to abolish state power”? Yes, we do, but not right now; we cannot do it
yet. Why? Because imperialism still exists, because domestic reaction still
exists, because classes still exist in our country. Our present task is to
strengthen the people’s state apparatus — mainly the people’s army, the people’s
police and the people’s courts — in order to consolidate national defense and
protect the people’s interests. Given this condition, China can develop
steadily, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party,
from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a new-democratic into a socialist and communist society, can abolish classes and realize the Great
Harmony. The state apparatus, including the army, the police and the courts, is
the instrument by which one class oppresses another. It is an instrument for the
oppression of antagonistic classes; it is violence and not “benevolence.” “You
are not benevolent!” Quite so. We definitely do not apply a policy of
benevolence to the reactionary classes. Our policy of benevolence is applied
only within the ranks of the people, not beyond them to the reactionaries or to
the reactionary activities of reactionary classes. ...

Here, the method we employ is democratic,
the method of persuasion, not of compulsion. When anyone among the
people breaks the law, he too shall be punished, imprisoned or even
sentenced to death; but this is a matter of a few individual cases, and
it differs in principle from the dictatorship exercised over the
reactionaries as a class.
As for the members of the reactionary
classes and individual reactionaries, so long as they do not rebel,
sabotage or create trouble after their political power has
been
overthrown, land and work will be given to them as well in order to
allow them to live and remold themselves through labour into a new
people. (DC, 369-70)
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A Promising Start?
In
line with Mao’s statement, Article 5 of the Common Program
guaranteed
to all, except for “political reactionaries,” the rights of
freedom of “thought, speech, publication, assembly, association,
correspondence,
person, domicile, moving from one place to another, religious belief,
and the freedom to hold processions and demonstrations.” It promised equal rights to women, and the end of their lives of “bondage.” The
program
then outlined an ambitious plan for rural reform through rent reduction
and land redistribution, and for the development of heavy
industry. ...
Exact
figures on land reform for the whole of China are
hard to come by, but it is estimated that in central south
China ... about 40 percent of the cultivated land was seized from
landlords and redistributed, and that 60 percent of the population
benefited in some way. The gain per head was between 1/6 and 1/2 acre,
so that a family of five might receive from below 1 to just above 2
acres. Such amounts could not give families complete security, but for
many it opened new possibilities of survival, especially for those who
had previously lived in atrocious poverty. (SMC, 461-2)
In the cities, by contrast, the first tasks for
the Communist government were to prevent violent social confrontations,
and to encourage industries to reopen and workers to stay at their
jobs. ... It was CCP policy to keep most city officials in their
jobs — often as many as 95 percent — and to guarantee them,
along with teachers and even the police, continued employment as long
as they joined in group reform and discussion sessions, and studied the
works of Mao Zedong. ...
Intensive campaigns were launched against financial speculators, and on behalf of the new government renminbi, or “people’s currency.” ... [C]ampaigns were [also] launched against prostitution
and opium addiction. Prostitution was effectively cut back through a
system that registered all housing and monitored male visitors and
their departure times. Known prostitutes, along with their madams or pimps, were enrolled in special prisonlike “schools,”
where they were lectured on the class contradictions that had led them
to waste their lives, and were taught alternative ways of earning their
livings. ... Similarly, opium addiction was dramatically
reduced with enforced methods of “cold turkey” withdrawal,
and by making the former addicts’ families responsible for their
staying clean. Mass campaigns against addiction, the uprooting of poppy
fields, and the execution of opium traffickers clinched the success of
these measures. (SMC, 463-4)
Were these reasonable policies?
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Diplomatic Recognition of the PRC
cf. SMC, 470
1949 | | October 2
October 3
October 4
October 5
December 9
December 30 | USSR
Bulgaria, Romania
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia
Yugoslavia
Burma
India | 1950 | | January 4
January 6
January 9
January 13
January 14 | Pakistan
(Great Britain),* Ceylon, Norway
Denmark, Israel
Finland, Afghanistan
Sweden | |
* The Chinese rejected Britain’s January 6 offer, since the British maintained formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
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Tibet Autonomous Region within the People’s Republic of China |
   |
Historic Tibet as claimed by Tibetan exile groups |
    |
Tibetan areas as designated by the People’s Republic of China |
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Chinese-controlled areas claimed by India as part of Aksai Chin |
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Indian-controlled areas claimed by China as part of Tibet |
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Other areas historically within Tibetan cultural sphere |
The “Liberation” of Tibet
The Tibetan operations, though logistically
complex, were not expected to offer much challenge to the now seasoned
PLA troops, especially since India had become independent in 1947 and
the British had lost their paramount interest in maintaining
Tibet’s buffer status. Chinese Communist troops invaded Tibet in
October 1950 in order to “liberate” the country from
“imperialist oppression.” Despite the poignant Tibetan
protest, “Liberation from whom and what? Ours was a happy country
with a solvent government,” the United Nations took no action,
nor would India or Britain intervene on Tibet’s behalf. The
Chinese occupied the key points in the country within a year and
pressured the Dalai Lama’s advisers into general acceptance of
China’s sovereignty over the region. (SMC, 471)
The Qing rule over Tibet was established after a Qing expedition force defeated the Dzungars
who occupied Tibet in 1720, and lasted until the fall of the Qing
dynasty in 1912. The Qing emperors appointed imperial residents known as
the Ambans to Tibet, who commanded over 2,000 troops stationed in Lhasa and reported to the Lifan Yuan, a Qing government agency that oversaw the region during this period. During this era, the region was dominated by the Dalai Lamas with the support from the Qing dynasty established by the Manchus in China. At the beginning of the 20th century the British and Russian Empires
were competing for supremacy in Central Asia. Unable to establish
diplomatic contacts with the Tibetan government, and concerned about
reports of their dealings with Russia, in 1903-04, a British expedition
led by Colonel Francis Younghusband
was sent to Lhasa to force a trading agreement and to prevent Tibetans
from establishing a relationship with the Russians. In response, the Qing foreign ministry asserted that China was sovereign over Tibet, the first clear statement of such a claim.
In 1907, Britain and Russia agreed that in “conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet”
both nations “engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet
except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government.”
For the next thirty-six years, Tibet enjoyed de facto independence while China endured its Warlord era, civil war, and World War II. Some Chinese sources argue that Tibet was still part of China throughout this period.
Some other authors argue that Tibet was also de jure independent after
Tibet-Mongolia Treaty of 1913, before which Mongolia has been recognized
by Russia.
The People's Republic of China (PRC), founded in October 1949 by the victorious Communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong, lost little time in asserting a new Chinese presence in Tibet. In October 1950, the People's Liberation Army entered the Tibetan area of Chamdo,
defeating sporadic resistance from the Tibetan army. In 1951, Tibetan
representatives participated in negotiations in Beijing with the Chinese
government. This resulted in a Seventeen Point Agreement which formalized China's sovereignty over Tibet, but was repudiated by the present Tibetan Government-In-Exile.
- Why did China “liberate” Tibet?
- Does China have a legitimate claim to Tibet?
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The Loss of Taiwan
The
Taiwan challenge was considered far more
serious. ... By the summer of 1950 the military consolidation over
south
China was complete, and a large force of veteran PLA troops were moved
to the Fujian coastal region, but they were not ordered into action
against Taiwan at that time. ... There was at this time nothing to
suggest that the United States would intervene in the Chinese conflict
any further. ... State Department staff went ahead and drafted the
official statement they would issue once Taiwan had fallen into
Communist hands. Public declarations by both General Douglas
MacArthur, the commander of occupied Japan, and Dean Acheson now
defined the new American “defensive perimeter” in the
Pacific as running along a line connecting the Aleutians, Japan,
Okinawa, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. The Chinese could take note
that this definition of American strategic interests did not include
Taiwan, nor did it include South Korea, which since 1945 had emerged as
an independent state under American patronage, separated from
Soviet-dominated North Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel. Once
Taiwan was conquered, the PRC could therefore expect to take its
rightful place in the United Nations, for which it was already actively
lobbying. (SMC, 471-3)
The Korean War
The apparent harmony of these American and
Chinese stances was shattered on June 25, 1950, when a massive force of
North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and invaded
South Korea. Within a few weeks, North Korean forces had advanced
swiftly down the peninsula,
capturing Seoul and forcing the South Koreans to a final desperate
stand at the harbor of Pusan. ... President Truman responded by ordering
U.S. troops based in Japan to assist South Korea. ... The crucial change
in the war came in mid-September, when, in a daring and brilliantly
executed amphibious maneuver, MacArthur landed his forces at the harbor of Inchon, to
the rear of the North Korean lines, and threatened to cut off their
retreat. As the North Korean troops began to break to retreat homeward, Zhou Enlai notified the Indian ambassador, who was acting as the
conduit for Chinese
messages, that China would have to intervene if the
United States invaded North Korea. U.S. troops
did cross the border on October 7, and pushed on northward to the
Chinese border along the Yalu River. At this point both Stalin and Mao
began to waiver ... [arguing] the merits of leaving the North Koreans
to their own devices, to fight whatever guerrilla war they were capable
of. Only on October 13 — allegedly won over by the passionate arguments
of Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang — did Mao agree to allow Chinese
“volunteers” to move across the North Korean border as long as the
Soviet Union gave full air support. ... The commander of the Chinese
forces, Peng Dehuai, coordinated his forces superbly, and in bitter
fighting that December, the Chinese pushed the allies back once again
to a line along the thirty-eighth parallel. ... The war dragged on
for a painful two years, ending with a truce signed in July 1953. ... By
that time U.S. casualties had reached over 160,000 (54,000 dead,
103,000 wounded, 5,000 missing), South Korean casualties 400,000, North
Korean 600,000, and Chinese between 700,000 and 900,000. ...
[T]he events of the war were used to reinforce
Chinese perceptions of the evils of Western imperialism, and
particularly to isolate the United States as China’s prime enemy.
American involvement in Korea was pointed to as clear evidence of U.S.
ambitions in east Asia, and of the implacable hatred of the United
States for China and the Chinese people. (SMC, 473-6)
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Mass Party
Mass Campaigns
The
CCP had learned, during the Yan’an
Rectification Campaign of 1942, how to scrutinize itself, force its
members into self-criticism, and use group pressure and intimidation to
arrive at an apparent consensus. In the early 1950s these experiences
surfaced again in four major campaigns involving the mass mobilization
of the Chinese people. The first of these was the Resist America and
Aid Korea Campaign ... which focused on foreigners in
China. The party ordered police searches of alleged spies, confiscated
objects such as radio receivers and firearms, and investigated public
associations that included or had contact with foreigners —
whether these associations were involved in cultural, business, health,
or religious pursuits. These investigations scared away many Chinese
who had formerly associated with foreigners. Foreign business assets
were frozen in December 1950, and foreign businesses — although not wholly expropriated — were pressured into selling out, often at artificially low prices. ...
Given momentum by the anger and excitement of the
Korean War, a second mass campaign was directed at domestic
“counterrevolutionaries.” Millions of Chinese who had been
in Guomindang party or youth organizations, or had served in Guomindang
armies, had stayed on in their homeland when the Communists took over.
They had never been thoroughly investigated, and some of them no doubt
harbored pro-Chiang Kai-shek sympathies. ... As the campaign grew in
intensity it became brutal and terrifying. For millions of Chinese the
violence and humiliation of these days effectively ended any hope that
they would be able to live out their lives peacefully under the
Communist regime, whatever their past histories might have been. ...
The CCP leadership had already been planning a
third mass campaign — this one against corruption within their own
party. Even before the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries campaign
was over, the party was mobilizing for what was termed the Three Anti
campaign, which was directed against three sets of vices stated to be
common among three occupational groups: the three vices were
corruption, waste, and obstructionist bureaucracy; the three targeted
groups were Communist party members themselves, the wider circles of
bureaucratic officials ... and the managers of factories and other
businesses. ... The Three Anti drive drew much of its energy from a
fourth mass campaign that was waged concurrently — the Five Anti
campaign. This campaign was designed as an all-out assault on the
bourgeoisie in China, an act of class war that mirrored in scope, rage,
and effectiveness its counterpart in the countryside — the campaign
against rural landlords. The targets of the Five Anti drive were
specifically identified as those Chinese industrialists and businessmen
who had stayed on in China after the Communist takeover, and also those
who “represented” the capitalist class, a vague definition
that could incorporate anyone the state chose to charge. The five vices
that were to be expunged were “bribery, tax evasion, theft of
state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state
economic information.” ...
Hu Sidu Denounces his Father, Hu Shi
In the old society, I considered my father as an “aloof”
and “clean” good man. Even after the liberation I felt deeply insulted whenever
my father was being criticized. Within my heart I strongly objected to Premier
Zhou Enlai’s calling my father a man who never understood what imperialism
means. After I read the History of Social Development, State and Revolution,
History of Chinese Revolution and many other books written by Communists, my
concept of my father began to change. ...
Today, after
my education in the Party, I begin to recognize his true qualities. I have come
to know that he is a loyal element of the reactionary class and an enemy of the
people. ... Today I realize the lenient policy of the People’s government. It gives
a chance to all those who have acted against the interests of the people to live
down their past and start life anew, only if they can come to realize their past
misdeeds.
Until my father returns to the people’s
arms, he will always remain a public enemy of the people, and an enemy of
myself. Today, in my determination to rebel against my own class, I feel it
important to draw a line of demarcation between my father and myself. ... (DC,
387-9)
“[D]espite
demonstrating his loyalty to the Communist Party by rejecting his
family, Hu Sidu was branded a ‘rightest’ and persecuted. He committed
suicide in 1957.” (DC, 387) |
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In
China as a whole, the Three Anti and Five Anti campaigns had an immense
effect. The CCP revealed that it was not going to protect private
businesses any longer, or tolerate the maze of semilegal practices that
had continued in China after 1949. Chinese capitalists were now
threatened just as foreign capitalists had been the year before, and
enormous fines were levied on them for what were often baseless
charges. ... The main purpose of the campaigns was to assert government
control over workers’ organizations, and to end the independent modes
of operation of capitalists and bureaucratic functionaries. In sharp
contrast to the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries campaign, few of
the Three Anti and Five Anti victims were killed. Almost all were
terrified or humiliated or both, and many had not only to pay their
fines but also to repay all money they had allegedly taken in graft or
withheld from their taxes; some had their property confiscated and were
sent to labor camps. ... At the end of 1952, the CCP leadership felt
confident in swelling the ranks of the party as a whole to 6 million.
Even those who had never seen a guerrilla unit or experienced life in
the countryside now had had at least a taste of revolution. (SMC, 478-83)
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